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ABSTRACT 
This paper utilizes NVivo 12 Plus, a type of qualitative data analysis software, for 
qualitative document content analysis as a means of understanding informal 
fiscal policymaking practices, including bribery, corruption, collusion, lobbying, 
negotiation, and transactional politics. Use of NVivo 12 Plus for qualitative 
document content analysis facilitated the management, analysis, and visualiza- 
tion of data on informal fiscal policymaking. More specifically, qualitative con- 
tent analysis of decisions of the Supreme Court of Indonesia revealed that 
informal fiscal policymaking in Malang City, Malang Regency, and Batu City, 
Indonesia, involved the practices of bribery, corruption, collusion, lobbying, 
negotiation, and transactional politics between regional leaders, bureaucrats, 
private actors, and political brokers. This paper contributes a qualitative re- 
search designthatcan be usedto explaininformal practices infiscalpolicymaking 
and budget management. 
Keywords: Qualitative Data Analysis Software, Informal Policymaking, Fiscal 
Politics, Content Analysis 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding informal policymaking practices poses 
unique challenges to Indonesianists around the world 
(Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2012; Dorotinsky & Pradhan, 
2007). The greatest challenge to researchers investigat- 
ing informal policymaking practices is difficulty obtain- 
ing data on these practices (Dutta, 2009). Informal 
policymaking practices refer to the political processes 
through which collusive, corruptive, and transactional 
fiscal policies are produced (Dorotinsky & Pradhan, 



















Salahudin, Nurmandi, A., & Loilatu, 
M. J. (2020). How to Design 
Qualitative Research with Nvivo 
12 for LocalGovernment 
Corruption Issue in Indonesia? 
Jurnal Studi 




August, 31st 2020 
Accepted: 
November, 04th 2020 
 
370 processes are perpetrated by politicians and bureaucrats who wield 
authority and political power (Montambeault & Goirand, 2016). 
These actors communicate, interact, and make political agree- 
ments in order to promote the formulation of fiscal policies 
that promote their own interests (Rubin, 2019). 
Also involved in informal fiscal policymaking are private sec- 
tor actors with political influence (Farhan, 2018), which they 
gain by establishing strong politico-economic relationships with 
politicians and bureaucrats in order to advance their own inter- 
ests. From a rent-seeking perspective, these private-sector actors 
are capable of exerting dominance over politicians and bureau- 
crats (Adi, 2018), thereby influencing policymaking and ensur- 
ing their interests are accommodated (Asher & Novosad, 2019). 
Also involved in informal fiscal policymaking are political bro- 
kers and criminals, who become involved in the process by bridg- 
ing political, government, and private-sector actors. 
Informal fiscal policymaking occurs behind closed doors, open 
to and involving only actors with sufficient politico-economic 
power, authority, and influence (Lambsdorff, 2018). In such a 
situation, it is difficult—if not impossible—to guarantee budget 
transparency. Data on informal fiscal policymaking cannot eas- 
ily be obtained, and as such researchers have been unable to 
provide a detailed and comprehensive understanding of the 
practice (Flick, 2009). Earlier studies have investigated infor- 
mal fiscal policymaking processes through interviews with in- 
formants who are not directly involved in these practices, in- 
cluding activists, social figures, politicians, and journalists as their 
informants (Montambeault & Goirand, 2016). These interviews 
are generally complemented by observation of formal fiscal 
policymaking processes, i.e. those that occur in accordance with 
established mechanisms and procedures. Several studies have 
taken policy documents as data in their investigation of infor- 
mal fiscal policymaking (Rumbul, Parsons, & Bramley, 2018). 
Such studies are significantly limited by their data, which are 
incapable of providing a detailed understanding of thepolitical 
 
 
processes involved informal fiscal policymaking, including the 
roles, communications, and collusive, corruptive, and transac- 
tional interactions between politicians, bureaucrats, and private- 
sector actors. As such, this paper seeks to produce a qualitative 
research design that is capable of understanding informal fiscal 
policymaking. 
This paper offers a research design that emphasizes the use 
of qualitative document content analysis through NVivo 12 Plus, 
a qualitative data analysis software. Qualitative document con- 
tent analysis facilitates the study of informal fiscal policymaking, 
as it does not require data to be collected in the field (i.e. through 
interviews, observations, and focus group discussions). Rather, 
it reveals informal fiscal policymaking practices by exploring the 
practices of corruption and bribery revealed within decisions of 
the Supreme Court of Indonesia. In the current era of open 
information, all court documents regarding cases of corruption 
are published through official government websites. Research- 
ers thus accessed court documents regarding cases of budget cor- 
ruption, then analyzed said documents using NVivo 12 Plus. This 
analysis produced quality data, the validity of which could be 
proven scientifically (Woods, Paulus, Atkins, & Macklin, 2016). 
Through NVivo 12 Plus, the researchers were able to produce 
data regarding informal fiscal policymaking processes, includ- 
ing the practices of corruption and bribery involved. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
INFORMAL FISCAL POLICYMAKING 
Fiscal policymaking refers to the political process through 
which fiscal policy is produced, and involves political actors such 
as elected officials, legislators, party elites, and civil society 
(Yandra, Nasution, Harsini, & Wekke, 2018). These actors be- 
come involved in in the policymaking process to ensure that the 
policy produced accommodates their specific interests (Rubin, 
2010). As part of the political process, fiscal policymaking in- 
volves the distribution of money between actors with an inter- 
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372 est in fiscal policy (Montambeault & Goirand, 2016). As such, 
the question of how funds are distributed to all involved actors 
is fundamental in studies of fiscal policymaking (Rubin, 2019). 
Studies must consider how government, political, and informal 
actors prepare fiscal policy through political negotiations and 
transactions, as well as how they exchange resources in order to 
advance their own interests (Rumbul et al., 2018). 
Studies of fiscal policymaking must also consider the involve- 
ment of formal and informal institutions in various parts of the 
process (Montambeault & Goirand, 2016; Alatas et al., 2013). 
Formal institutions are those actors whose involvement in the 
policymaking process is provided by existing systems, mechanisms, 
and laws, while informal institutions are those actors whose in- 
volvement is not legally mandated (Trantidis & Tsagkroni, 2017; 
Farrell & Héritier, 2003). Such informal institutions are more 
prone to practices of clientelism, patronage, rent-seeking, and 
corruption (Farhan, 2018; Slater & Simmons, 2013). 
In general, the interactions between executive and legislative 
actors in fiscal policymaking are used as arenas for transactional 
politics, resulting in practices of bribery and corruption (Grillos, 
2017). Executive and legislative institutions have their own spe- 
cific interests, with the former generally seeking to use public 
funds for infrastructure development and the latter often pri- 
oritizing social empowerment activities. In many cases, legisla- 
tive institutions are only willing to accommodate the interests 
of executive institutions when they are offered bribes (Basri & 
Nabiha, 2014). Where legislative institutions are willing to ac- 
commodate executive proposals and allocate funds for them, 
fiscal policymaking processes initially follow the legally mandated 
mechanisms and processes. Ultimately, however, they often re- 
sort to informal political transactions and compromises, thereby 
providing fertile ground for bribery and corruption 
(Montambeault & Goirand, 2016). 
For governments and politicians, fiscal policy is a political 
tool, as controlling fiscal policy enables them to maintain their 
 
 
power. They use their power and authority to create fiscal poli- 
cies that advance the political interests of themselves and their 
supporters (Lucas, 2016; Wong, 2010). They fund political pro- 
grams and activities, or distribute money directly to constitu- 
ents, who are expected to provide their political support in re- 
turn (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2012; Rumbul et al., 2018). In 
this context, Hallerberg (2019) writes ―for individual politicians 
… the budget is a resource deployed to enhance political sup- 
port. A politician can attempt to influence budget allocation in 
order to gain political support from particular groups. Thus, from 
this perspective also, budget-making is necessarily a political pro- 
cess.‖ Politicians, from executive leaders to legislators, thereby 
attempt to prepare fiscal policies that enable them to maintain 
their political power. 
The above discussion of fiscal policymaking shows that the 
process involves informal actors and institutions, and is replete 
with cartelism, clientelism, and elite capture. A range of politi- 
cal actors, including civic groups, political parties, private sector, 
non-government organizations, and governments, are jointly 
involved in the political process, with their communications and 
negotiations being used to determine and formulate fiscal policy 
that represents their own political interests. This process is domi- 
nated by actors who have the power and influence to advance 
their specific interests (Rumbul et al., 2018). 
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QUALITATIVE STUDIES OF INFORMAL FISCAL 
POLICYMAKING 
Scholars have employed a wide range of research approaches 
to understand informal fiscal policymaking, both in developing 
and developed nations. One commonly used approach is the 
qualitative approach, through which researchers examine the 
subject based on qualitative data collected through interviews, 
observations, government reports, non-governmental analyses, 
and participatory action research (Montambeault & Goirand, 
2016; Rumbul et al., 2018). Numerous studies have employed a 
 
374 qualitative approach to show that informal fiscal policymaking 
is common in Africa, Brazil, and China, where government of- 
ficials, politicians, and private-sector actors often establish pa- 
ternalistic relationships (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2012; 
Dorotinsky & Pradhan, 2007). 
Although these studies have shown that informal actors are 
frequently involved in fiscal policymaking, their findings have 
been derived primarily from observations of and interviews with 
local residents, whether or not they are involved in informal 
fiscal policymaking (Montambeault & Goirand, 2016; Rebecca 
Rumbul et al., 2018). As such, there may be bias in their depic- 
tions of the paternalistic relationship between politicians, gov- 
ernment officials, citizens, and private-sector actors (Flick, 2009). 
Another shortcoming of these studies lies in their data analysis, 
which generally employs conventional techniques to read and 
understand informal fiscal policymaking practices in regions or 
countries that have received previous academic interest. 
Previous studies have yet to implement an innovative research 
design, such as software-based qualitative document content 
analysis, to understand informal fiscal policymaking. As such, 
their analytical results and findings have been unable to com- 
prehensively illustrate the informal practices such as cor- 
ruption, bribery, and transactional politics involved in infor- 
mal fiscal policymaking (Woods et al., 2016). NVivo 12 offers 
significant benefits for analyzing qualitative data, including docu- 
ment content, by producing data of sufficient quality to explain 
the practices of bribery, corruption, collusion, lobbying, nego- 
tiation, and transactional politics (involving politicians, bureau- 
crats, private sector actors, and political brokers). 
 
RESEARCH LOCATION SETTING 
Research was conducted in Batu City, Malang City, and 
Malang Regency. These three autonomous municipalities are 






FIGURE 1. MAP OF BATU CITY, MALANG CITY, AND MALANG REGENCY 
 
Together, these three municipalities are known as Greater 
Malang, with Malang City (previously the administrative center 
of Malang Regency) gaining autonomy in 1999 and Batu City 
having been produced through the administrative division of 
Malang Regency in 2001. Executive officials from all three mu- 
nicipalities have been found guilty of corruption, having em- 
bezzled money from the municipal budget. Such cases of corrup- 
tion have also involved other actors. In Batu City, for example, 
embezzlement involved bureaucrats and private-sector actors; in 
Malang City, it involved bureaucrats, legislators, and private- 
sector actors; and in Malang Regency it involved bureaucrats, 
political communities, and private-sector actors. 
This study investigates the involvement of executive officials, 
bureaucrats, legislators, and private-sector actors in practices of 
corruption and bribery during fiscal policymaking processes in 
Batu City, Malang City, and Malang Regency. As such, it seeks 
to answer the following research question: 
How are the informal fiscal policymaking processes in Batu City, 
Malang City, and Malang Regency, Indonesia? 
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376 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS SOFTWARE IN DOCU- 
MENT ANALYSIS 
This study employs a qualitative approach to examine budget 
corruption in Greater Malang, with a focus on the embezzle- 
ment of funds from the local budgets of Malang City, Malang 
Regency, and Batu City. For its data, it draws from the decisions 
of the Supreme Court of Indonesia regarding the criminal prac- 
tice of budget corruption in Greater Malang. Qualitative con- 
tent analysis of these documents provides an understanding of 
budget corruption in Greater Malang. 
In qualitative research, documents are defined as artifacts 
that are produced and access by human beings (Flick, 2009). 
The documents discussed in this paper are the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Indonesia regarding the criminal practice of 
budget corruption in Greater Malang, were produced by the 
Supreme Court of Indonesia in accordance with applicable In- 
donesian legal processes and procedures. Since the passage of 
the Law on Public Information Openness (Law No. 14 of 2008), 
all of the Supreme Court’s decisions have been published online 
through the Directory of Supreme Court Decisions (https:// 
putusan3.mahkamahagung.go.id/). The documents discussed in 
this study were accessed from this directory. 
The selected documents fulfilled the criteria of authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness, and meaningfulness (Flick, 2009). 
The authenticity criterion is fulfilled by these documents’ hav- 
ing been produced by the Supreme Court of Indonesia through 
a process of investigation and advocacy. These documents also 
fulfill the credibility criterion, having been produced in accor- 
dance with applicable procedures and processes. They were iden- 
tified as representative, and thereby able to provide the data 
necessary to answer the research question. Finally, the decisions 
used for this analysis were meaningful, as they are capable of 
describing the practice of budget corruption in Greater Malang. 
This study employs qualitative document content analysis, 
analyzing Supreme Court decisions throughscientific processes 
 
 
and procedures. Document analysis requires the capability and 
skill to interpret and translate data as a means of answering the 
research question (Flick, 2009). To facilitate the collection, man- 
agement, and qualitative analysis of data, thereby improving the 
credibility of the data and subsequent findings, qualitative data 
analysis software has been developed (Wallmeier, Helmig, & 
Feeney, 2019). In this case, such software has been employed to 
analyze the Supreme Court decisions and produce an under- 
standing of corruption in Greater Malang. 
Analysis was conducted using NVivo 12 Plus, a qualitative 
data analysis software that facilitates the collection, categoriza- 
tion, mapping, analysis, and visualization of qualitative data, 
including that collected from documents (memos, reports, legis- 
lations, and photographic documents) and through interviews 
(Bazely & Richards, 2013). NVivo 12 Plus was used to analyze 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Indonesia regarding the 
criminal practice of budget corruption in Greater Malang 
through data management, actor network mapping, data classi- 
fication, and research demographic management. 
Research involved several stages, as follows: research topic 
determination, research design, research approach determina- 
tion, data analysis design, interpretative data analysis, and re- 




FIGURE 2. RESEARCH PROCESS 
 
As shown by Figure 2, the first stage of the research pro- 
cess involved the determination of the research topic by prepar- 
ing a review of the literature. Second, the research design was 
decided, with qualitative content analysis of Supreme Court 
377 
 
378 decisions ultimately being chosen. Third, the research approach— 
a content analysis approach involving frame/concept/theme/ 
node coding—was chosen. Fourth, a software-based data analysis 
technique was chosen. Finally, the collected data were interpre- 
tatively analyzed and the findings were discussed. 
 
QUALITATIVE DOCUMENT CONTENT ANALYSIS 
This study employs qualitative content analysis, a research 
method that emphasizes the textual analysis of documents such 
as government regulations and public opinion pieces as well as 
the results of observations, interviews, and focus group discus- 
sions. Qualitative content analysis is intended to systematically 
describe, translate, and interpret data (Krippendorff, 2004). As 
such, it requires the ability to translate, interpret, and give mean- 
ing to textual data, and this ability informs data quality. This 
study employs a qualitative approach to analyze decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Indonesia regarding the criminal practice of 
budget corruption in Batu City, Malang City, and Malang Re- 
gency. 
One principle of qualitative content analysis is that the sum- 
mary of a document can be used to understand it as a compre- 
hensive textual unit. In this context, the original text of the 
document is defined and understood through a particular frame/ 
concept, with said frame/concept showing the meaning and sig- 
nificance of the original text (Flick, 2009). A frame/concept may 
be formulated based on a review of prior studies (deductive frame) 
or based on data collected in the field (inductive frame) 
(Neuendorf, 2020). 
Content analysis involves several stages, namely research ques- 
tion determination, data selection, frame/concept formulation, 
interpretation and classification of data within the frame/con- 
cept, data analysis, data elucidation, and finding interpretation 
(Flick, 2009). This is clarified further in Table 1 below. 
 






CONTENT ANALYSIS OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
How are the informal fiscal 
policymaking processes in Batu 
City, Malang City, and Malang 
Regency, Indonesia? 
 
Data Selection Decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Indonesia regarding the Criminal 












Data Evaluation and 
Modification 
Frame/Concept/Theme/Node 
formulated based on a review of the 
literature and the Supreme Court 
decisions. Node formatting was 
done using NVivo 12 Plus. 
The Supreme Court decisions were 
coded into specific nodes/themes. 
Data coding was done using NVivo 
12 Plus. 
Coded data were evaluated and 
modified using NVivo 12 Plus. 
 
Data Analysis Coded data were analyzed using 
Nvivo 12 Plus. 
 
Presentation and 
Interpretation of Findings 
Results of data analysis were 
analyzed and discussed 
 
 
DOCUMENT COLLECTION TECHNIQUE 
Research data in the form of Supreme Court decision docu- 
ments regarding criminal acts of budget corruption in Malang 
City, Malang Regency, and Batu City are accessed in the Su- 
preme Court decision directory https://putusan3. mahka- 
027mahagung.go.id/. The Supreme Court Decision Directory 
provides a search page for decision documents of all courts in 
Indonesia and provides files of all types of decisions including 
decisions on corruption in Malang City, Malang Regency and 
Batu City (table 2). 
 
DATA ANALYSIS USING NVIVO 12 PLUS 
This study employs the spiral data analysis technique devel- 
oped by Creswell (2014), which consists of five stages: (1) data 
organization, (2) document reading and preparation, (3) descrip- 
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Source: Supreme Court of Indonesia, 2019. 
 
 
(4) data interpretation, and (5) data presentation and visualiza- 
tion. Spiral analysis thereby requires a researcher to continu- 
ously analyze and organize qualitative data. This approach will 
produce a report or conclusion regarding budget corruption and 
political networks in Greater Malang. NVivo 12 Plus was used 
for the five stages of spiral analysis, as shown in Table 3 below: 









• Data Importing 
• Data Folder Creation 
IMPORT, DATA 
Data • Data Classification File Classification 
Classification • Data Attribute Entry Case 
Classification 
Data Coding • Research Node/Theme Code and Case 
Creation 
• Case (Actor, Organization, and 
Location) Creation 
• Nodal/Thematic Categorization 
of Text 
Data Analysis • Nodal/Thematic Analysis per 
Case (Organization) 
• Nodal/Thematic Analysis per 
Case Attribute (Type of 










DATA MANAGEMENT USING NVIVO 12 PLUS 
The import feature of NVivo 12 Plus was used to input the 
collected Supreme Court decisions into an NVivo 12 Plus DATA 
file. The process involved three stages: 
1. Three folders were created through the DATA menu. These 
folders were named in accordance with the research loca- 
tion: Malang Regency, Malang City, and Batu City. 
2. The research data (Supreme Court decisions) were imported 
into the three folders using NVivo 12 Plus’ IMPORT fea- 
ture, as made available through the DATA menu. 
3. The imported research data (Supreme Court decisions) were 
classified as Government Documents using the FILE CLAS- 
SIFICATION menu. 
 







DATA CLASSIFICATION USING NVIVO 12 PLUS 
The Supreme Court documents were classified based on the 
organizations involved in budget corruption in Batu City, Malang 
City, and Malang Regency. Data classification involved the fol- 
lowing stages. 
1. Case folders were created, being named in accordance with 
the research location. Each case was classified through Case 
Folder Organization (Table 5). 
 
TABLE 5. CASE FOLDER ORGANIZATION FOR ANALYZING BUDGET CORRUPTION IN GREATER MALANG 
CASEFOLDERNAME CASE FOLDER CLASSIFICATION 
 
Malang Regency Organization 
Batu City Organization 
 
Malang City Organization 
 
2. Folders for Case Organizations was created. Then, name of 
the Cases in the Organizational Cases folders was in accor- 
dance with the name of the organization in the Supreme 
Court decision (table 6). 
3. Fill in the Case / demographic attributes of the study. All the 
cases were given their respective identities titled Institution 
Type and Organization Type (table 6) 
FOLDER NAME DATA FILE NAME FILE CLASSIFICATION 
Malang Regency Ali Murtopo Government Document 
 Rendra Kresna Government Document 
Batu City Eddy Rumpoko Government Document 
 Edi Setiawan Government Document 
 Filipus Djap Government Document 
Malang City Moch Anton Government Document 
 Jarot Edy Sulistiyono Government Document 




TABEL 6. CASE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE POLITICAL CORRUPTION NETWORKS OF GREATER MALANG 383 
CLASS OF CASE ORGAN 
NAME OF CASE ORGANIZATION    

































Golkar Faction  
 
 
PKB Faction  
 
 
PAN Faction  
 
 
PDIP Faction  
 
 




















Speaker, Local Parliament  
 
 



















































Source: Exported from Nvivo 12 Plus 
 
 
CODING TECHNIQUE AND DATA ANALYSIS WITH 
NVIVO 12 PLUS 
One of the most important elements of qualitative content 
analysis is the coding of the document text. For this study, docu- 
ment coding involved the categorization of Supreme Court de- 
cisions based on the concepts presented through the literature 
review (deducative coding) and based on the findings of coding 
process (inductivecoding). Coding involved the following stages: 
(1) Node creation, with the name of each node reflecting the 
research concepts identified in the literature review and find- 
 
NAME OF CASE ORGANIZATION 
CLASS OF CASE ORGAN 
    
TYPE OF INSTITUTION 
ZATION 
TYPEOFORGANIZATION 
Office of Expenditure, Revenue, and Asset 
Management 
Official Government Government 
Agriculture Office Official Government Government 
Malang Regency Government (Treasurer) Official Government Government 
Contractors' Association Private Sector Private Sector 
Office of Public Works Official Government Government 
CV Tunjang Langit Private Sector Private Sector 
CV Adhijaya Sakti Private Sector Private Sector 
CV Sawunggaling Private Sector Private Sector 
CV Karya Mandiri Private Sector Private Sector 
CV Kartika Fajar Utama Private Sector Private Sector 
CV Adhikersa Private Sector Private Sector 
Auction Committee Official Government Government 
Information Technology Team Official Government Government 
Bureau of Electronic Data Management, 
Electronic Procurement Service 
Official Government Government 
Office of Education Official Government Government 
Rendra–Subhan Campaign Team Political Groups Political Groups 




ings of the coding process; and (2) Reading, understanding, and 
inputting the text of the Supreme Court decisions in accordance 
with the nodes used. 
TA BLE 7. NODE FOR M AT/RES EARC H THEMES 
 
 




• Collutive Relations 
• Transactional Relations 
• Political Lobbying 
• Political Negotiation 
Six nodes used to answer questions regarding 
informal fiscal policymaking processes in 




Data were analyzed using Nvivo 12 Plus through its Explore 
Chart feature, which offered values for each node (theme) based 
on the Case (Organization) and Attribute (type of institution 
dan type of organization). The values obtained through the Ex- 
plore Chart feature were used to understand the informal fiscal 
policymaking processes of Malang City, Malang Regency, and 
Batu City, Indonesia. 
 
RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS WITH NVIVO 12 PLUS 
Informal Fiscal Policymaking Practices in Malang City, Malang 
Regency, and Batu City 
Analysis of the Supreme Court decisions regarding the crimi- 
nal practice of budget corruption in Batu City, Malang City, 
and Malang Regency shows that a range of informal political 
activities were involved in fiscal policymaking. These included 
corruption, lobbying, and collusive relationships between actors 
with power, access, and authority in local government agencies. 
Figure 3 shows that Malang City had the highest value of 
informal fiscal policymaking (81.51%), followed by Batu City 
(11.78%) and Malang Regency (5.89%). Collusive relationships 
between actors were highest in Malang City (38.27%), followed 
by Batu City (31.54%) and Malang Regency (30.17%). Corrup- 
tion was most prevalent in Malang City (57.53%), followed by 
Malang Regency (20.58%) and Batu City (20.07%). Lobbying 
was most common in Malang City (96.48%), followed by Batu 
 
386 City (1.88%) and Malang Regency (1.61%). Political negotiations 
were highest in Malang City (74.80%), followed by Malang Re- 
gency (15.05%) and Batu City (8.77%). Finally, transactional 
political practices were most prevalent in Malang City (56.61%), 
Malang Regency (22.10%), and Batu City (21.27%). 
FIGURE 3. INFORMAL  FISCAL  POLICYMAKING PRACTICES IN  MALANG CITY, MALANG REGENCY, AND  BATU CITY 
 
FIGURE 4. ACTORS INVOLVED IN INFORMAL FISCAL POLICYMAKING IN MALANG CITY 
 
ACTORS INVOLVED IN INFORMAL FISCAL 
POLICYMAKING IN MALANG CITY 
The actors involved in informal fiscal policymaking included 
the government, political organizations, and the private sector. 
These actors were actively involved in the informal fiscal 
 
 
policymaking processes through acts of bribery, collusion, cor- 
ruption, political lobbying, political negotiations, and transac- 
tional politics. 
From Figure 4, it is evident that political organizations were 
the most dominant actor in informal fiscal policymaking in 
Malang City, followed by government organizations and private- 
sector actors. Bribery amongst political organizations had a value 
of 134.17%, while values of 43.47% and 0.91%. were recorded 
amongst government organizations and private-sector actors, 
respectively. Collusive relationships were most prevalent 
amongst political organizations (63.29%), followed by govern- 
ment organizations (54.96%) and private-sector actors (5.67%). 
Budget corruption is dominated by political organizations 
(99.55%), followed by government organizations (53.12%) and 
private-sector actors (1.65%). This was also true for political lob- 
bying, where political organizations had a value of 168.86%, 
government organizations had a value of 114.41%, and private- 
sector actors had a value of 5.00%. Political organizations played 
an active role in political negotiations at every stage of the in- 
formal fiscal policymaking process, returning a value of 108.54%; 
this was followed by government organizations (85.25%) and 
private-sector actors (3.91%). Finally, transactional politics was 
intensively used by political (92.12%) and government organiza- 
tions (72.70%), but less intensively by private-sector actors 
(6.06%). 
The involvement of these organizational actors in informal 
fiscal policymaking processes in Malang City was represented by 
the involvement of individual actors, including the members 
and leaders of these organizations. In Malang City, political or- 
ganizations were represented by members of parliament. Gov- 
ernment organizations were represented by the mayor and by 
bureaucrats, while private-sector actors were represented bycor- 









Figure 5 shows that members of parliament, representing 
political organizations, were more heavily involved in informal 
fiscal policymaking in Malang City than bureaucrats (govern- 
ment officials), political officials/the mayor (elected officials), 
and private-sector actors. Amongst the members of parliament 
in Malang City, the practice of bribery had a value of 131.11%, 
followed by bureaucrats (43.47%), the mayor (3.00%), and pri- 
vate-sector actors (0.91%). Meanwhile, bureaucrats were more 
actively involved in establishing collusive relationships, followed 
by members of parliament (53.72%), the mayor (9.57%), and 
private-sector actors (5.67%). In regards to budget corruption, a 
value of 90.65% was found for members of parliament, followed 
by 53.12% for bureaucrats, 8.90% for the mayor, and 1.65% for 
private-sector actors. The political lobbying value for members 
of parliament was 135.52%, with lower values found for bu- 
reaucrats (114.01%), the mayor (33.33%), and private-sector ac- 
tors (5.00%). Political negotiations were dominated by members 
of parliament (92.26%), followed by bureaucrats (85.25%), the 
mayor (16.26%), and private-sector actors (3.91%). Finally, trans- 

















FIGURE 5. TYPES OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN INFORMAL FISCAL POLICYMAKING IN MALANG CITY 
 
 
ment (74.36%) and bureaucrats (72.70%), followed by the mayor 
(17.76%) and private-sector actors (6.06%). 
 
Actors in Informal Fiscal Policymaking in Malang Regency 
In Malang Regency, informal fiscal policymaking involved 
government organizations, private-sector actors, and political 
brokers/political communities. These organizations utilized col- 
lusive relationships, corrupt practices, political negotiations, and 
transactional interactions in their policymaking activities. 
 
 
FIGURE 6. ACTORS INVOLVED IN INFORMAL FISCAL POLICYMAKING IN MALANG REGENCY 
 
Figure 6 shows that, government organizations had a value 
of 102.06% in establishing collusive relationships, followed by 
private-sector actors (45.39%) and political communities (9.27%). 
Government organizations also dominated the practice of cor- 
ruption (62.89%), followed by private-sector actors (24.03%) and 
political communities (6.13%). Meanwhile, while government 
organizations also dominated active political negotiations 
(51.82%), political communities were more active than private- 
sector actors (10.80% versus 1.44%). Transactional relationships 
were widespread in informal fiscal policymaking in Malang Re- 
gency, with government organizations taking a dominant role 
(65.22%) followed by private-sector actors (39.36%) and politi- 
cal communities (6.34%). 
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390  In this case, government organizations were represented by 
the Regent (an elected official) and bureaucrats (government 
officials); private-sector actors were represented by entrepreneurs; 
and political communities were represented by campaign teams 
and political brokers. Bureaucrats were dominant in all stages 
of the informal fiscal policymaking process, being supported by 
private-sector actors, campaign teams, political brokers, and the 
regent. 
FIGURE 7. TYPES  OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN INFORMAL FISCAL POLICYMAKING IN MALANG REGENCY 
 
Government officials, including office heads and project staff, 
established collusive communications and relationships with 
other actors. These bureaucrats were most active (with a value 
of 59.59%), followed by private-sector actors (45.39%), the re- 
gent (13.98%), and political communities (2.27%). Practices of 
budget corruption in Malang Regency predominantly involved 
government officials (34.52%) and private-sector actors (24.03%), 
followed by the regent (10.30%) and political communities 
(6.13%). In their political negotiations, government officials re- 
ceived a value of 29.99%; in this, they were supportedby politi- 
cal communities (10.80%), the regent (8.22%), and private-sec- 
tor actors (1.44%). Transactional politics most commonly in- 
volved private-sector actors (39.36%) and government officials 
(36.87%), but at times political communities (6.34%) and the 
regent (6.25%) were involved (Figure 7). 
 
 
Actors in Informal Fiscal Policymaking in Batu City 
Unlike in Malang City and Malang Regency, where infor- 
mal fiscal policymaking involved government organizations, 
political organizations, and private-sector actors, in Batu City 
the process only involved government organizations and private- 
sector actors (Figure 8). These organizations were actively involved 
in all types of informal fiscal policymaking, including bribery, 




FIGURE 8. ACTORS INVOLVED IN INFORMAL FISCAL POLICYMAKING IN BATU CITY 
 
In Batu City, bribery was predominantly practiced by the pri- 
vate sector (11.78%), followed by government organizations 
(5.72%). Meanwhile, the establishment of collusive relationships 
most commonly involved government organizations (43.79%), 
followed by private-sector actors (33.22%). Corruption values 
were higher amongst government organizations (27.35%) than 
amongst private-sector actors (16.96%). Both used political lob- 
bying in their informal fiscal policymaking processes, receiving 
a value of 1.88%. In political negotiations, government organi- 
zations (11.55%) were more active than private-sector actors 
(8.76%); this reinforces the view that the government provided 
lobbying spaces for private-sector actors. Finally, in their trans- 
actional practices, government actors in Batu City dominated 
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392 private-sector actors (27.32% versus 2.26%) (Figure 8). 
Government organizations involved in informal policymaking 
practices included the mayor (an elected official) and bureau- 
crats (government officials); meanwhile, the private-sector ac- 
tors involved in corruption, collusion, negotiation, transactional 
politics, and bribery in Batu City were local entrepreneurs. These 
organizations were mutually complementary in informal fiscal 




FIGURE 9. TYPES OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN INFORMAL FISCAL POLICYMAKING IN BATU CITY 
 
Figure 9 above shows that private-sector actors dominated 
the informal fiscal policymaking activities in Batu City, followed 
by bureaucrats and the mayor. Bureaucrats and entrepreneurs 
had almost equal opportunities to commit bribery, the latter 
actors were slightly more active (11.78% versus 11.70%); mean- 
while, the mayor was less involved (5.72%). Entrepreneurs were 
also the most active (33.22%) in establishing collusive relation- 
ships during informal fiscal policymaking activities, followed by 
bureaucrats (28.40%) and the mayor. Meanwhile, bureaucrats 
contributed most significantly to budget corruption (20.13%), 
followed by private-sector actors (16.96%) and the mayor 
(11.52%). Bureaucrats and entrepreneurs were equally involved 
 
 
in political lobbying (1.88%); the mayor, conversely, was not di- 
rectly involved in lobbying. Nonetheless, the mayor was involved 
in the process of political negotiations (4.48%), which is an in- 
trinsic part of the lobbying process. Bureaucrats and private-sec- 
tor actors were almost equally involved in such negotiations, 
with the former slightly more active (8.77% versus 8.76%). Pri- 
vate-sector actors (21.26%) were heavily involved in creating 
transactional politics with government officials (17.39%) and the 
mayor (16.75%), with such transactions being used to advance 
their interests in the informal fiscal policymaking process. 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
A qualitative document content analysis of Supreme Court 
decisions regarding the practice of corruption in Malang City, 
Malang Regency, and Batu City using Nvivo 12 Plus has shown 
that the informal policymaking processes in these municipali- 
ties have involved bribery, corruption, collusion, lobbying, po- 
litical negotiations, and transactional politics (Basri & Nabiha, 
2014). In Malang City, the informal fiscal policymaking process 
involved all of these practices intensively. Meanwhile, while these 
practices were less intensive in Batu City and Malang Regency, 
they occurred in both municipalities’ informal fiscal policymaking 
processes (Rebecca Rumbul et al., 2018). 
The intensiveness of informal fiscal policymaking practices 
in Malang City can be attributed to the number and diversity of 
the actors involved, including political organizations, government 
organizations, the mayor, and private-sector actors. Most domi- 
nant in the informal fiscal policymaking process in Malang City 
were political organizations, followed by government organiza- 
tions and private-sector actors; this is evidenced by these politi- 
cal organizations’ involvement in practices of bribery, corrup- 
tion, lobbying, negotiation, and transactional politics 
(Montambeault & Goirand, 2016). Members of parliament were 
more commonly involved in informal fiscal policymaking activi- 
ties than government officials, elected officials, and private-sec- 
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394 tor actors (Dorotinsky & Pradhan, 2007); as such, they positioned 
themselves as having greater influence in the informal fiscal 
policymaking process. Under their influence, the mayor, bureau- 
crats, and entrepreneurs became involved in the informal fiscal 
policymaking process (Yandra et al., 2018). 
In Malang Regency, meanwhile, the informal fiscal 
policymaking process involved government organizations, pri- 
vate-sector actors, and political communities (Montambeault & 
Goirand, 2016). In this case, the regent—an elected official—regu- 
lated and controlled the informal fiscal policymaking process 
(Adi, 2018). He instructed government officials, including the 
leaders of local government offices, to commit informal 
policymaking practices such as negotiation, lobbying, political 
transactions, and providing private-sector actors access to gov- 
ernment projects (Adi, 2018; Montambeault & Goirand, 2016). 
Furthermore, the regent instructed local bureaucrats to work 
with the political communities that supported him and to in- 
clude them in fiscal policymaking (Trantidis & Tsagkroni, 2017). 
Private-sector actors (i.e. entrepreneurs) worked in conjunc- 
tion with the Malang Regency government to formulate fiscal 
policy, doing so by establishing collusive relationships with the 
regent, bureaucrats, and political communities (Arias, 2018; 
Wong, 2010). In order to facilitate access to government-funded 
development projects (Berenschot, 2018), during the informal 
fiscal policymaking process entrepreneurs practiced bribery, lob- 
bying, corruption, and political negotiation with the regent, 
bureaucrats, and project brokers. This was positively received by 
the regent and by local bureaucrats, and supported by political 
communities. Ultimately, corruption, bribery, and transactional 
politics were widely practiced during the budgeting process (Arias, 
2018; Kostiuchenko, 2014). 
In Malang Regency, the dominant political community was 
the regent’s campaign team, a group of elites that acted collec- 
tively as a project and fiscal broker (Jones, 2013). This political 
community was established during the regional election, when 
 
 
it campaigned for the regent, accumulated political power, and 
raised funds from entrepreneurs with their own specific inter- 
ests in the election and in the regional budget (Auriol & Flochel, 
2015). After the conclusion of the election, this political com- 
munity served as a project and fiscal broker, working to connect 
the regent with entrepreneurs and to control bureaucrats’ for- 
mal fiscal policymaking activities (Arias, 2018). 
In Malang Regency’s informal fiscal policymaking activities, 
government organizations were more dominant than private- 
sector actors and political communities. Meanwhile, private-sec- 
tor actors were more active than political communities, as illus- 
trated by their willingness to work in conjunction with govern- 
ment officials. Political communities, finally, served as project 
and fiscal brokers in Malang Regency (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 
2012). 
Finally, two types of actors were involved in the informal 
fiscal policymaking process in Batu Regency, namely government 
organizations and private-sector actors (Montambeault & 
Goirand, 2016). Private-sector actors dominated this process, with 
the support of bureaucrats and the mayor. At the same time, 
the mayor provided spaces for informal fiscal policymaking ac- 
tivities, while bureaucrats enabled entrepreneurs’ practice of 
bribery, collusion, corruption, lobbying, negotiation, and trans- 
actional politics (Farhan, 2018; Montambeault & Goirand, 2016; 
Rubin, 2019). As such, although the Mayor of Batu did not domi- 
nate the informal fiscal policymaking process in the city, he was 
a major source of the bribery, corruption, collusion, lobbying, 
negotiation, and transactional politics that occurred during the 




Qualitative content analysis was conducted using NVivo 12 
Plus, which was involved in document collection, data manage- 
ment, data classification, node creation, and thematic/topical 
coding of Supreme Court decisions regarding practices of cor- 
 
396 ruption in Malang City, Malang Regency, and Batu City. It found 
that informal policymaking activities involved the practices of 
bribery, corruption, collusion, lobbying, negotiation, and trans- 
actional politics. Such activities were more prominent in Malang 
City than in Batu City and Malang Regency. In Malang City, 
the informal fiscal policymaking process was dominated by po- 
litical organizations, as represented by members of parliament. 
Meanwhile, in Malang Regency, the process was dominated by 
government organizations, as seen by the active involvement of 
the regent and local bureaucrats. Finally, in Batu City, the in- 
formal fiscal policymaking process was dominated by private- 
sector actors, though the practice itself was rooted in the mayor’s 
promotion of informal approaches to fiscal policymaking 
amongst the municipality’s bureaucrats. 
In analyzing informal fiscal policymaking processes, the main 
strength of NVivo 12 Plus is its ability to ensure that data are 
well organized. In this case, Supreme Court decisions were orga- 
nized well; informal fiscal policymaking activities were clearly 
identified; informal fiscal policymaking practices such as brib- 
ery, corruption, collusion, lobbying, negotiation, and transac- 
tional politics were mapped systematically; analytical results were 
clearly visualized; and research findings were organized well, 
enabling the researchers to understand the informal fiscal 
policymaking processes in Malang City, Malang Regency, and 
Batu City. Nonetheless, the use of NVivo 12 Plus for content 
analysis is limited in its ability to triangulate data, as the results 
of its analysis of Supreme Court documents could not be con- 
firmed with other primary data (i.e. interviews and observa- 
tions). As such, analysis of Supreme Court documents regarding 
informal fiscal policymaking practices must be supported with 
data collected through interviews, observations, and reviews of 
other documents, which would promote a more comprehen- 
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